


Fund Objective

To achieve stable, long-term growth by investing in a diversified bond portfolio.

Fund Performance (S\$ Bid-to-Bid returns)



	John Hancock Worldwide Bond (%)	Benchmark
3 mth	5.37	5.30
6 mth	6.17	7.00
1 yr	-0.53	1.30
3 yr	1.46	1.70
5 yr	0.61	1.70
10 yr	1.60	2.90
Since Inception	1.57	3.50

Source: Legg Mason Asset Management Singapore Pte. Limited • Performance are bid-to-bid with income reinvested • Performance figures for 3 mth till 1 yr show the % change, those exceeding 1 yr show the average annual compounded return.

Benchmark: With effect from 1 April 2011, the benchmark is Citigroup World Government Bond Index ex Japan (Hedged to S\$)

The CPF interest rate for the Ordinary Account (OA) is based on the 12-month fixed deposit and month-end savings rates of the major local banks. Under the CPF Act, the Board pays a minimum interest of 2.5% p.a. when this interest formula yields a lower rate. From 1 Jan 08, the new interest rate for the Special, Medisave & Retirement Accounts (SMRA) will be pegged to the yield of 10-year Singapore government bond plus 1%. For 2008 and 2009, the minimum interest rate for the SMRA will be 4% p.a. After 2009, the 2.5% p.a. minimum interest rate, as prescribed by the CPF Act, will apply to SMRA. In addition, from 1 Jan 08, the CPF Board will pay an extra interest of 1% per annum on the first \$20,000 of a CPF member's combined balances, including up to \$20,000 in the OA. From 1 April 08, the first \$20,000 in the Ordinary and Special Accounts will not be allowed to be invested under the CPF Investment Scheme. And from 1 May 09, the first \$30,000 in the Special Account will not be allowed to be invested under the CPF Investment Scheme and further raised to \$40,000 in 1 July 2010.

The John Hancock Worldwide Bond Fund feeds into Legg Mason Global Bond Trust with effect from 3 January 2005. The Trust is managed by Legg Mason Asset Management Singapore Pte. Limited, sub-managed by Western Asset Management Co Pte. Ltd.

Note: JH (the existing John Hancock Signature Investment Funds)

Key Information

Launch Date	: 8 June 1999	Launch Price	: S\$1.00
Bid Price	: *S\$1.1508	Management Fee	: 0.65% p.a.
Offer Price	: *S\$1.2114 @ 5% sales charge (RP plans) / *S\$1.1864 @ 3% sales charge (SP plans)	Admin Fee	: 0.60% p.a.
CPFIS Risk Classification:	NA	Dealing	: Daily
Subscription	: SRS/Cash		
Price published In	: The Straits Times, Business Times, Lianhe Zaobao, www.manulife.com.sg		
Min Investment	: S\$5000 (single premium), S\$100 (monthly premium)		
Min Top-Up	: S\$1000	Bid-Offer Spread	: 5% (RP) / 3% (SP)

Important Information: This report is prepared by Manulife (Singapore) Pte Ltd and is provided for information purposes only. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.

Asset Allocation*

Net Asset Value = S\$41,621,475.21

Euro	50%
GBP	8%
USD	22%
Other Currencies	18%
Cash	2%

Top Five Holdings*

Buoni Poliennali Del Tes 3% 01/11/2015
 Bundesrepub Deutschland Ser 05 (BR) 3.5% 04/01/2016
 Bundesschatzanweisungen Ser 1 (BR) 1% 16/03/2012
 US Treasury Bond 4.375% 15/11/2039
 Govt of Netherland 4% 15/01/2037

Fund Manager's Comments

- Investors hoping for a rebound in risk assets after last month's near-record sell-off were sorely disappointed. Risk premiums increased further, driven by a perception that a disorderly default by Greece (along with the possible systemic repercussions for the global economy) was increasingly plausible.
- The presence of such catastrophic risk has blurred the lines between liquidity and solvency. What started as a kernel of insolvency in specific areas of the eurozone has morphed into a widespread and self-fulfilling liquidity dynamic that now threatens the solvency of the whole system. Policymakers have no other choice but to muster the political will and organise a clear fiscal solution to address the underlying kernel of insolvency, not only for Greece but also for certain parts of the European financial system, notably Spanish banks. This would put long-term economic fundamentals back in the driver's seat, displacing the short-term liquidity dynamic that has been in control for much of the past six months.
- However, such a clear fiscal solution is practically unimaginable at the moment. So, we expect that the European crisis will continue to rumble along until such unimaginable solutions are not only imagined, but actually implemented. We remain underweight the euro, preferring the currencies of countries with stronger balance sheets and growth prospects. We also have a modest overweight to the US dollar, the traditional safe-haven currency, should conditions deteriorate at the global level.
- It is indeed clear that global uncertainty has increased perceptibly as a result of not only the European crisis, but also the prospect of a second recession in the US. Our base-case scenario does not include a second recession. We continue to see ongoing positive, albeit modest, growth in the US. This will most likely not be sufficient to work off the extreme spare capacity in the economy—as measured by the unemployment rate, for one—and therefore we see little threat of inflation. The Fed should maintain its near-exclusive focus on supporting growth and risky asset prices. We are not dissuaded from taking on additional interest rate risk in such an environment, and we look to manage duration positions across regions tactically. Longer-dated UST offer better value, in our opinion. Their yields are more sensitive to changing global economic conditions, and the curve could flatten if the Fed is forced into more aggressive monetary support.